Key Terms: Convergent arguments; linked arguments. Abstract: Most recent writers of informal logic texts draw a distinction between "linked" and "convergent" arguments. According to its inventor, Stephen Thomas, the distinction is of the utmost importance; it "seems crucial to the analysis and evaluation of reasoning in natural language." I argue that the distinction has not been drawn in any way that makes it both clear and of any real originality or importance. Many formulations are obscure or conceptually incoherent. One formulation of the distinction does seem tolerably clear and I develop another, but neither promises to make it matter much. We can well do without it.
1
Most recent writers of informal logic texts draw a distinction between "linked" and "convergent" arguments. The intuitive idea behind the distinction is that the premises of some (linked) arguments support their conclusions "in a united or combined way," while in other (convergent) arguments "each reason supports the conclusion completely separately and independently of the other." I Using the usual diagramming technique in which each arrow can be read as "therefore,''2 here is a case in which our intuitions go the first way:
Smoking marijuana is + against the law. I should not break the law.
I should not smoke marijuana.
In the following, the premises seem separately to support the conclusion:
I promised Harry that I would go into partnership with him.
\,
If I go into partnership with Harry, I will make a lot of money.
j I should go into partnership with Harry}
According to its inventor, Stephen Thomas, the linked/convergent distinction is of the utmost importance; it "seems crucial to the analysis and evaluation of reasoning in natural language. "4 Monroe Beardsley's earlier attempt to analyze arguments in natural language could not "be generally applied at all" because it lacked this "crucial" distinction,5
Despite its intuitive appeal and current popularity, I doubt that the distinction can be drawn in any way that makes it both clear and of any real originality or importance, Many formulations of the distinction are obscure or conceptually incoherent. One formulation does seem tolerably clear and I will develop another, but neither promises to make the distinction matter much. We can well do without it.
2
Some explanations of the distinction are suggestive but too unclear (too vague, metaphorical, etc.) to be of much real use. John Eric Nolt says that arguments are linked when the premises work in conjunction, rather than separately, in support of the conclusion. 6 In linked arguments, according to Thomas, each premise "is helped by the others to support the conclusion. "7 We know how people building a house or huskies pulling a sled can work in conjunction or help one another, but how do such "inert" things as premises do so? Robert J. Yanal tells us that the reasons in "dependent" (linked) arguments are in the same line of thought; reasons in "independent" (convergent) arguments are not in the same line of thought. 8 This is indeed suggestive, but our vague ideas about what it might mean are shattered when Yanal says "it is important to remember that" convergent arguments, those whose premises are "not in the same line of thought," may still have premises that are "linked conceptually. "9 If premises can be "not in the same line of thought" but still "linked conceptually," do we have any idea at all what it means to be or not to be "in the same line of thought"?
When we look carefully at some other formulations of the distinction, our reaction is likely to be: "Surely this is not what the authors really mean to say." Yanal, for instance, also says that arguments are linked when their reasons "fill in each other's logical gaps (i.e., support each other)"; otherwise, arguments are convergent. lO We cannot take this literally because reasons do not themselves have "logical gaps." And the requirement for linked arguments certainly cannot be that the premises "support each other," as if PI Probably what is meant here has to do with "logical gaps" between premises and a conclusion and premises "supporting each other" in closing those gaps. But again the formulation seems at best unhelpful. For to say there are "logical gaps" between some premises and a conclusion means that it is possible for those premises to be true and the conclusion false. Should every additional premise that makes the falsity of the conclusion less likely (makes the gap "smaller") be diagrammed as linked? Then only additional premises that do not succeed in really adding support for the conclusion would be diagrammed as convergent, which is, presumably, not what is meant. To say, instead, that linked premises are those that do not just close the gap but "support each other" in closing the gap is no advance on the previous vague formulations in terms of "working together" and being "in the same line of thought."
Here is another of Thomas's formulations:
[1]f each reason alone would be enough, if true, to support the conclusion, and if the falseness of one reason would not weaken a step of reasoning from the other to the conclusion, then the reasoning can be diagrammed as convergent. But if the falseness of a reason would weaken the step from the other(s) to the conclusion, then link that reason together with the other( s) in the diagram. ll This apparently means that if P 1 and P2 are offered in support of C, each does support C, and P 1 when taken alone supports C as much as it-( P 1 )-does when conjoined with P2 (P2 does not add to the support P 1 gives to C), the reasoning is convergent.
To apply this principle, we must compare the amount of support PI gives to C in T C But what does it mean to ask how much PI supports C in the second case? How much does the conditional support the conclusion in a case of modus ponens? Consider the argument: "Gerbils are a lot like hamsters and hamsters make good pets. So gerbils make good pets." How much does each premise support the conclusion? I doubt that these questions have a sense, and so that this formulation of the distinction has a sense.
Alec Fisher puts the distinction this way:
If several reasons are given for some conclusion there are two possibilities: the reasons may be presented as jointly supporting the conclusion (taken together they support the conclusion but each in isolation does not [linked] ) or they may be presented as independently [convergently] justifying it (so that if you accept one of the reasons the author expects you to accept the conclusion).12 But consider this argument: Since each premise alone supports the conclusion, the argument does not meet Fisher's criterion for being joint (linked). And since neither premise independently justifies (or is offered as independently justifying) the conclusion, it also does not meet his criterion for independent (convergent) support. Fisher's account of the supposedly exhaustive distinction between independent and joint support will not account for the frog case or for any other whose premises are independently relevant to its conclusion but individually fail to justify it.
The frog generalization is neither convergent nor linked on Fisher's account. It could be both given yet two other of Thomas's various formulations. When "each reason supports the conclusion com- The relevance criterion, however, does not capture whatever it is that is intuitively plausible in the distinction. Many arguments that are intuitively linked would become convergent on this criterion. And we cannot assess these arguments as convergent-assess the separate lines of support for a conclusion and somehow use the results to arrive at an overall evaluation-with any hope of reaching a correct overall evaluation. 18 Consider some cases:
Nadine lays eggs. Nadine suckles her young. So Nadine is a platypus. 19
Each premise is relevant to the conclusion, but they are not intuitively separate the way the premises of the partnership example are. And since each taken alone gives only the smallest degree of support to the conclusion, we cannot "combine" that support and get the correct result that the premises give rather strong support to the conclusion. (Nadine could only be a platypus or a spiny anteater.) We do not need to look to exotic animals to find such examples. The best candidate for the philosophy position at Northern University will be a specialist both in medieval philosophy and in contemporary modal logic. There are specialists in each of these fields but there may not be many who are expert in both. So to evaluate Harvey is specialist in medieval philosophy. Harvey has a specialization in contemporary modal logic. So Harvey is the best candidate for the philosophy position at Northern University.
we have to consider the degree of support the two premises taken together give the conclusion.
Many of our most everyday bits of reasoning show that individually relevant premises cannot be considered independently.
The wind is picking up. The clouds are thickening. It is getting cold. Surely it will snow before dawn.
Here each factor is relevant to the conclusion that it will snow, but no one of them gives much support. The factors together make a stronger case than any "combination" of their individual degrees of support.
Diagramming individually relevant premises as convergent and then evaluating them independently will even lead to missing some valid inferences.
She is cither in the living room or in the bedroom. She is not in the living room. So she is in the bedroom.
The first premise taken alone is obviously relevant to the conclusion (making it 50% likely). And any information that something is not in some one place increases, however slightly, the likelihood that it is in some other particular place. So the second premise is also relevant to the conclusion. Evaluating the argument by "combining" these degrees of support gives a starkly wrong result, since the premises taken together give a valid argument. 20 In sum, if individual relevance of premises is the criterion for convergence, the distinction does not correspond to whatever intuitions we might have about "separateness" of premises. Further, an argument being convergent on this criterion cannot serve as an "instruction" to evaluate each line of support separately or to evaluate the degree of support of the premises for the conclusion in any other particular way. So if there is any evaluative importance to the linked/convergent distinction, understood in this way, it is not in the area of the degree of support premises give to a conclusion. We will look again at the relevance criterion in section 8.
4
Before considering Thomas's suggestion that statistical generalizations should be diagrammed as linked, because "the strength of support is much greater when the instances are considered in union together, "2J let us think how we should evaluate strength of support. Remarkably, most who claim that the linked! convergent distinction is important for evaluation say nothing about how to evaluate convergent arguments. Clearly we cannot simply add the degrees of support of the separate lines. 
j 70%
Herbert robbed the bank.
Adding the degrees of support will give a total of over 100% which does not make sense. According to Noh, the "reasoning of a [convergent] argument will generally be as strong as the strongest chain of reasoning it contains. "22 This is his only example: 23 Cats are furtive and sneaky.
Cats always have fleas +
Anything which has fleas is a nuisance.
j
Cats are a nuisance.
Since the inference on the right is valid, the argument as a whole is valid, according to Nolt's way of evaluating. This is the correct evaluation, but it is hard to think of a procedure that would not give the correct one in this sort of case. Before there was diagramming, if we were given these premises in support of this conclusion, we would have written the argument in standard form. We would have known that the argument is valid, because if (2) and (3) are true, then (4) will be true, and so if (2), (3), and (1) are true, then (4) will be true.
Consider some other cases that intuitively seem convergent. Nolt's method of "totaling" would pick the inference on the right and conclude that, relative to all of the premises, it is 70% probable that Herbert will die before age 30. But this looks wrong. For Herbert's smoking alone makes it 70% likely that he will die before 30. Surely the perilous motorcycling could have some further effect on the likelihood of his early death. Normally, we would expect that the motorcycle riding is an additional threat to Herbert and that it, given his smoking, would make his early demise more than 70% likely.24
Here is a similar but even simpler case. A person shot at by two entirely independent sharpshooters, each of whom usually hits her target, is at greater risk than someone being shot at by only one of the sharpshooters.
Sharpshooter A will shoot at Herman one time + She hits her target 80% of the time. This argument suggests another way of "totaling" the degree of support separate inferences give a conclusion.
If Herman is lucky, his will be one of the twenty cases of every hundred in which A is inaccurate. Still, since B is 90% accurate, in 18 of those 20 cases B's bullet can be expected to hit Herman. 25 So the overall chance of Herman being shot (hit by at least one bullet) is 98%. We cannot get this answer using Nolt's method of taking the overall degree of support to be the degree of support of the strongest inference to the conclusion.
5
If Yanal is correct, the "sharpshooter method" will always be the correct one for "totaling" the separate degrees of support in a convergent argument. Consider an argument that would be diagrammed as uncertainty. Now. when R2 .. .is brought forward, we have decreased our uncertainty by 0.4. We now know 0.4 times 0.7, or 0.28 more than we knew before. In total, we know the conclusion with 0.3 (the probability of RI) plus 0.28 (the probability of R2 times the remaining "unknown" left over from 0.3), which equals 0.58. 26
But the sharpshooter method also cannot be relied on to give correct evaluations of apparently separate lines of support.
Harvey handles cobras barehanded + 80% of people who handle cobras barehanded die young.
\,
Harvey drinks antifreeze for breakfast + 90% of people who drink antifreeze for breakfast die young. j Harvey will die young.
As in the smoking/motorcycle case, the sharpshooter method's answer would be that it is 98% likely that Harvey will die young. But this ignores too many possibilities: perhaps drinking antifreeze daily makes one completely or partially immune to the effects of cobra venom, so that those who both handle cobras and drink antifreeze are at lower or no risk; perhaps any antifreeze drinker dies instantly on contact with a cobra. 27 Given the premises telling us that Harvey both handles snakes and drinks antifreeze for breakfast, what we need to know to evaluate the likelihood of the conclusion is something like X% of those who both handle snakes and drink antifreeze for breakfast die young.
And this sort of information is not a function of the premises about snakehandling and antifreeze-drinking taken independently.
The sharpshooter method seems to give the right result about the likelihood of Herman being shot, but it does so only insofar as we are making the natural assumption that the sharpshooters are independent of one another in every respect. Suppose that sharpshooter A misses every target that B misses. In that case, A will pose no additional threat to Herman, and he stands no more than the 90% chance of being shot. And in the motorcycle/smoking case, motorcycle riding may actually decrease smoker Herbert's chances of dying before age 30. The clean outdoor air in cyclists' faces might cleanse the lungs, erase any threat of lung disease, and leave only the 60% chance of dying on his cycle.
Let We may conjecture that smoking and cycling are independent threats (smokers dying of smoking, cyclists from cycling) and "total" in the sharpshooter manner. But nothing in the argument justifies this conjecture. And even if we were to make it, the problems noted before come into play: maybe cycling cleanses the lungs, etc. 
Each of these can make a difference to the overall likelihood that Herbert dies young.
With all of these possibilities, it would be naive to assume that the sharpshooter method will correctly "total" the intuitively separate lines of support for the conclusion about Herbert's early demise.
6
While the sharpshooter method cannot be counted on to correctly "total" intuitively separate amounts of support, in some cases (as when it is given that the sharpshooters are completely independent), it does do so, With this in mind, we can look at Thomas's suggestion that statistical generalizations should be diagrammed as linked, because "the strength of support is much greater when the instances are considered in union together. "29 This accords with Yanal's formulation of the way "to present the real distinction between convergent and linked reasons in principle":30 To identify an argument as convergent or linked using this definition we (a) determine the total amount of support the premises considered separately give the conclusion, using the sharpshooter method;
(b) determine the amount of support the premises considered together give the conclusion;
(c) take the amount in (a) to be the actual amount of support the premises give the conclusion unless the amount of support in (b) is greater, in which case (b) gives the actual amount; (d) if the actual amount of support is as given in (a), diagram the argument as convergent; if the actual amount of support is as given in (b), diagram the argument as linked.
In short, an argument is convergent, and properly evaluated by the sharpshooter method, unless considering the premises together gives more support for the conclusion. Roughly (disregarding "ties"), this means that we should diagram and evaluate the argument in whichever way gives the greater amount of support for the conclusion.
Let us call this the Yanal criterion for evaluating arguments.
If we adopt the Yanal criterion, we cannot analyze arguments as linked or convergent before we evaluate them. Now the classification is a result of the evaluative work. 32 So any idea that we need the distinction in order to know how to evaluate arguments is essentially abandoned. More important, unless we restrict our attention to the simplest cases (considering the premises of an instance of modus ponens together will give more support than considering them separately), carrying out these steps is either impossible or not to be counted on to give the correct result.
Look at an earlier example:
\,
Harvey drinks antifreeze for breakfast + 90% of people who drink antifreeze for breakfast die young.
j
Harvey will die young.
Following step (a), we evaluate the argument by the sharpshooter method, finding the conclusion to be 98% likely. We know this may not be the right answer (the sharpshooter method does not always give the right answer), but we are not done yet.
Steps (b) through (d) are supposed to supply a sort of corrective for the cases when we should not analyze and evaluate premises as convergent. So going on to step (b), we consider the amount of support the premises all considered together give the conclusion. But this is just what we don't know: how likely it is that Harvey dies young given that he both handles cobras and drinks antifreeze. Perhaps we should look outside the argument itself for any connection between handling cobras and drinking antifreeze. Suppose we find out that antifreeze is a mildly effective cobra antivenom, and that (A) 60% of those who both handle cobras barehanded and drink antifreeze for breakfast die young.
To consider the given premises together (Harvey both handles cobras and drinks antifreeze) we should take (A) into account.
So now we have to compare J,
Since this makes the conclusion just 60% likely (the second and fourth premise dropping out as irrelevant), it does not make the conclusion more likely than does the convergent evaluation. Following (c), then, we take the convergent evaluation (and so the analysis) as the correct one. This is clearly a mistake. Not only does the analysis give the wrong result in such a case; the entire comparison is misguided. For while we are supposedly comparing the amount of support sets of premises considered separately give a conclusion to the amount of support they give it considered together, we are really comparing the original sets of premises, considered separately, to the original premises plus (A) considered together. We are not comparing the amounts of support some premises considered in different ways give a conclusion but the amount of support two different sets of premises give a conclusion.
To avoid this problem we could add (A) to the original set of premises when we consider them separately. Then we have this to evaluate: The sharpshooter method gives a likelihood of 99.2% to the conclusion." Since linking the premises gives a total support of only 60%, we have to adopt 99.2% as the correct amount of support and diagram the argument as convergent. Again we have the wrong answer. But surely we already knew we would not get a sensible evaluation from applying the sharpshooter method to this conglomeration of premises. Thus, despite its apparent simplicity and correctness in cases like modus ponens, in many other cases applying the Yanal criterion is difficult, nonsensical, or just gives the incorrect evaluation and analysis of the argument.
7
Why do we really consider the premises of a case of modus ponens together rather than separately? We do not have to say it is because they "work together," or are in "the same line of thought," or "they give more support to the conclusion that way." It is because we get the right answer that way. "If today is February 29, this is a leap year. Today is February 29. So this is a leap year." Neither premise by itself is even relevant to the conclusion, and so the "total" of their separate support is nil. But that is the wrong answer. We know what the right answer is: the premises cannot be true and the conclusion false, so the argument is valid. The "degree of support" is 100%.
This suggests a way of making a linked/convergent distinction that is in some respects similar to the Yanal procedure:
(a) consider how the premises relate to one another and to the conclusion. For instance, do the premises "overlap" as in one of the smoking/cycling arguments? Could they undermine one another as in the cobralantivenom case? Is the argument valid? Is it a statistical syllogism? An inductive generalization? .. Or can these premises in relation to this conclusion be counted on to "total" correctly using the sharpshooter method?
(b) If the answer to the last question is yes, diagram the argument as convergent. Otherwise diagram it as linked.
In shortest form, arguments are convergent if and only if they correctly "total"
by the sharpshooter method. Let us call this the real criterion. I suspect that the real criterion captures as well as possible any intuitive sense behind the notion of convergent arguments.
But understood in this way, the notion doesn't have the importance it seemed to promise. In convergent arguments the premises (or subsets of them) were to be related to conclusions in a very special way, independently of one another. We could analyze arguments, determine that this special relationship holds, and then (and only then) separately assess the independent lines of support, arriving at the correct evaluation of the overall degree of support for the premises.
But it is now apparent that we can never simply "read off" from the content of an argument that it is convergent. No matter how unrelated the premises may appear, we cannot ever assume that they correctly total by the sharpshooter method. 34 Rather we have to follow step (a), considering how the premises relate to the conclusion and to each other, i.e., consider them together. The cobra/antifreeze example, the cycle/smoking example, and the sharpshooter case itself show this. Even Thomas's most apparent instance of convergent reasoning may not correctly total convergently.
80% \ ,
j 70%
I should go into partnership with Harry. This is convergent only on the assumption that promise-keeping and money-making do not "interact" in some way. And we do not know that from anything in the argument. (It would not even be a great distortion of some ethical theories to suggest that, while both promise-keeping and money-making are desirable, any virtue there is in keeping a promise is nullified when doing so leads to material gain.)
Here is a case Yanal presents as clearly convergent: 35 Crow #1 is black + Crow #2 is black + + Crow # 100 is black.
\,
The encyclopedia tells me that all crows are black.
j
All crows are black.
Whether this is really convergent (properly sums by the sharpshooter method) depends on how the generalization on the left relates to the premise on the right. It could be that my observations of birds are not so reliable, and my encyclopedia is old and sometimes inaccurate, but almost every time my aviary observations agree with the aged encyclopedia's claims the accuracy rate is near 100% (a much greater amount of support than we would get by the sharpshooter method). Or it could be that almost every time my observations agree with the encyclopedia the encyclopedia is incorrect. Thus, even when premises apparently are entirely unrelated or "in a different line of thought," we have to look at how they might relate to one another and to the conclusion in order to know whether they "total" by the sharpshooter method and so whether the argument should be diagrammed as convergent. To do this is to do much of the work of evaluation. And it requires careful consideration of how the premises relate to each other and how they all together support the conclusion. We cannot first determine that an argument is convergent (and so to be diagrammed with separate arrows) and therefore know that we do not need to consider the premises together in order to evaluate properly the strength of the support for the conclusion.
Is it nonetheless worth showing in a diagram that an argument properly "totals" by the sharpshooter method? The premises of some arguments "total" by the principles of the propositional calculus or by quantification rules. The premises of other arguments "total" by putting together facts and applying Bayes' theorem. Still others rely on more imprecise principles about the strength of analogies or generalizing from instances. And, in some cases, premises "total" by the sharpshooter method. Is the difference between evaluating by the sharpshooter method and by quantification theory any more basic than the difference between evaluating by truth tables and by the generalization techniques of polling experts or by the rules of evidence in a courtroom, or by any other method appropriate to a given argument? To elevate only the former difference to a fundamental distinction between types of arguments seems, at best, a misleading bit of hyperbole.
It is, however, the only one of these distinctions that can be naturally shown by so simple an expedient as removing the plus sign from the premises in a diagram. This by itself may go far toward accounting for the pervasiveness of the linked/convergent distinction.
8
Perhaps we should not give up quite yet on finding some important rationale for the distinction. Thomas suggests we need the notion of a convergent argument because to refute the justification [given by a convergent argument], each of the different lines of reasoning must be dealt with and refuted separately (so that it is not enough for an opponent merely to show that one of the basic reasons is false).J6
The implication seems to be that if an argument is not convergent showing one of the premises to be false must mean rejecting the entire argument. Thus, without the notion of convergence, we would have to reject many arguments that should not be rejected.
This is all myth. Even when premises clearly "work together," we know perfectly well that the falsity of one need not necessitate rejecting the entire argument. Consider again the nonconvergent reasoning in a generalization: If I think that I have seen a great many frogs in my garden and each one is green, the falsity of "Last Wednesday I saw a frog in my garden and it was green" does not mean rejecting the conclusion "All the frogs in my garden are green." It just means that the report of this particular observation should not be included in the premises supporting the conclusion. (The falsity of "Last Wednesday I saw a frog in my garden and it was green" does not entail "I saw a frog and it was not green." Thomas seems to think that the failure of a confirming instance must be a disc on firming instance. 37 ) Similarly, in court, three witnesses place Ms. Goodbody at the comer where a man was quietly stabbed on Tuesday, making a strong case for her conviction.
("Witness 1 says that Goodbody was there; Witness 2 says ... So Goodbody is guilty.") The premises clearly "go together" since the agreement of the witnesses adds to the overall force of their testimony. Now when Witness 3 realizes that he was there not on Tuesday but rather on Monday and recants ("It is not the case that Witness 3 places Goodbody at the comer on Tuesday."), the case for the conclusion is weakened, but it is not destroyed. 32 Yanal himself makes this point in the APA article (p. 2).
. 13 The left line leaves 20% uncertainty. The middle line reduces the 20% to 2% uncertainty. The right line reduces that to .8% uncertainty. So the conclusion is 99.2% likely if we reason in this way. 34 Unless some combination of premises yields a valid argument. Then they and any others will correctly "total" by the sharpshooter or any other method. (See section 4 above.)
